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JUDICIAL SEPARATION*
A judicial separation, also known as a divorce a mensa et
thoro, legal separation and limited divorce "does not remove
the vinculum of marriage as does an absolute divorce." 1 The
marriage ties remain. The parties cannot marry again under
the decree, nor do they have to remarry to return to their
original married status. The rights, duties and obligations
which accompany marriage all remain, except those which
are withdrawn by the decree.2 The decree itself withdraws
the duty, in fact the legal right to demand cohabitation ;3 however, the parties remain husband and wife." This new limited
divorce differs from a mere separation agreement in that
the latter represents only a voluntary act of the parties, while
the former puts a formal, judicial stamp of approval on an
existing separation. The judgment becomes the measure of
the rights and duties of the marriage.' Generally, it is a mere
authorization to 'discontinue cohabitation for an indefinite
time.' It entitles the successful party to live apart from the
offending spouse without concern of later reprisals for desertion.'
HISTORY
Divorce from bed and board was originally a product
of the Roman Catholic Church which found its way into the
divorce law after the Council of Trent, in 1563, proclaimed
that a consummated marriage was indissoluble. The Church,
however, recognized that one spouse might commit such a
serious offense against the other that cohabitation would be
intolerable. Thus, the institution of limited divorce, when
the parties separated under official sanction but remained
husband and wife, came into being.8
The limited divorce was finally introduced in England
and became part of its ecclesiastical law. The time it was inWyo. Laws 1965, ch. 122, § 1-4, Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-47.1 to .4 (Supp. 1965).
McWilliams v. McWilliams, 216 Ala. 16, 112 So. 318, 319 (1927).
Drake v. Drake, 262 Ala. 609, 80 So. 2d 268, 270 (1955).
Scholz v. Scholz, 172 Neb. 184, 109 N.W.2d 156, 159 (1961).
Drake v. Drake, supra note 2.
See generally 27A C.J.S. Absolute and Limited Divorce § 160 (1959) for a
discussion of the characteristics of a limited divorce.
6. Williams v. Williams, 33 Ariz. 367, 265 Pac. 87, 90, 61 A.L.R. 1264 (1928).
7. Darden v. Darden, 249 Ala. 551, 29 So. 2d 409 (1947).
8. 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE §§ 23-30 (6th ed. 1881).
*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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troduced is not certain, but it was recognized in the Canon
Law in 1603. Canons 107 and 108 required the party bringing
the action for limited divorce to post bond in guaranty that
he or she would not marry again while separated.'
Being ecclesiastical law, it was not adopted as common
law in any of the United States and is purely statutory today.
There are thirty states, including Wyoming, that have statutes
which provide for a limited divorce. 0
THE

NEw LAW

This new addition to Wyoming's divorce law is contained
in four sections." The new statutes are mere additions to
the present statutory divorce law neither amending nor repealing existing laws.
The first section deals with the circumstances under
which an action for judicial separation will lie and the manner of beginning the proceeding. This section provides that
when any grounds for absolute divorce exist, the party may,
instead of praying for an absolute divorce, pray that he or
she be allowed to live separate and apart from the offending
party. The one seeking the judicial separation institutes the
proceeding in the same manner as does a person seeking an
absolute divorce under existing Wyoming Law. 2
The second section of the act provides that an absolute
divorce may be sought after a decree of judicial separation
has been issued. One who later 'desires an absolute divorce
may seek that remedy on any grounds for divorce that existed
at the time the judicial separation decree was issued and, with
two exceptions, upon any ground which thereafter accrues.
These exceptions, desertion and two-year separation, can be
used for a later absolute divorce only if they existed before
the rendering of the decree of judicial separation.""
9. 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 728 (6th ed. 1881).
10. The states today which have limited divorce in some form are: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
11. Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-47.1 to .4 (Supp. 1965).
12. WYO. STAT. § 20-47.1 (Supp. 1965).
13. Wyo. STAT. § 20-47.2 (Supp. 1965).
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The third section provides that the same procedure shall
be followed as though one were seeking an absolute 'divorce.
The court is given the power to render the same decrees which
are available in absolute divorce, including property division,
and it is also within the discretion of the court to make the
legal separation perpetual or for a limited period of time.
The parties may at any time move the court to be discharged
from the decree."
The last section provides that the same defenses shall
be available in an action for judicial separation as are available in an action for absolute divorce. 5
PUIROSE AND EFFECT
The purported purpose of the legislation is to allow the
injured party to obtain relief while still giving the offending
party an opportunity to make amends and re-establish the
marriage.'" The subject matter dealt with in the judgment
may be so extensive as to approach that of an absolute divorce,
but if reconciliation takes place the parties need only have
the court vacate the decree, on motion, to resume normal legal
marital relations. Since the decree does not operate as a
cancellation of the marriage itself, it does not preclude the
parties from resuming the marital relation without a second
ceremony ;17 however, subsequent cohabitation alone will not
render the decree a nullity. Before this legislation was enacted, the only legal means of relief, other than absolute divorce,
was an action for separate maintenance. The new remedy is
a marked departure from the decree of separate maintenance
under which resumption of normal married life usually abrogates the decree without further judicial action. 8
Generally, where the statutes provide the method by
which the parties may have the decree of judicial separation
vacated, nothing short of such action will suffice to render
it a nullity. Thus, the decree will not be altered by mere
14. WYo. STAT. § 20-47.3 (Supp. 1965).
15. WYO. STAT. § 20-47.4 (Supp. 1965).

16. Letter from Hugh M. Duncan, the drafter of the bill, dated October 8, 1965.
Mr. Duncan was an Assistant Senate Attorney during the 1965 session of
the Legislature.
17. In re Smith's Estate, 243 App. Div. 348, 276 N.Y. Supp. 646, 650 (1935).
18. Van Dolman v. Van Dolman, 378 Ill. 98, 37 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1941).
19. See 27A C.J.S. Grounds for Relief § 169 (1959) for material relating to
termination of a limited divorce decree.
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reconciliation and resumption of married life because the
new Wyoming statute provides that the parties must submit
a written declaration to the court to have the decree vacated.2"
The Arizona statute is similar to that of Wyoming and contemplates joint application for nullifying the decree." The
Arizona Supreme Court has held that nothing short of such
joint application will effectuate nullification of the decree.22
New Jersey's similar statute was formulated on the same
premise of joint application for any nullification of the 'decree. 8 The statute was the product of early New Jersey case
law which, in applying New York law, held that a decree of
judicial separation remains in effect notwithstanfding temporary reconciliation and cohabitation.2
Wyoming's new statute contemplates a motion by both
parties to be discharged from the decree.25 It appears that
nothing short of such action will suffice. The only exception
under this statute would be the expiration of the time limit
of the decree if the separation is decreed for a limited duration.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The decree of judicial separation has certain qualities
that are absent in the decrees of absolute divorce and separate
maintenance. These qualities may increase attempts at saving
broken marriages, or at least afford the opportunity if the
parties so elect.
While such a decree is in effect, the parties concerned
are free to attempt a reconciliation without the non-offending
spouse being guilty of condonation and thus precluding a
later action for absolute divorce. This is given its efficacy
by two principles. First, nothing short of action by the court
can alter the decree, therefore if the attempt fails, the party
may still rely on the original decree of limited divorce. Secondly, the statute explicitly provides that any grounds for
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Paille v. Paille, 91 N.H. 249, 17 A.2d 445, 448 (1941).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-333(c) (1956).
Williams v. Williams, supra note 6, at 89.
N. J. REv. STAT. § 2A:34-5 (1951).
Jones v. Jones, 29 Ati. 502, 503 (N.J. Ch. 1894).
Wyo. STAT. § 20-47.3 (Supp. 1965).
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'divorce existing at the time the decree was rendered remain
as valid grounds for a later action for absolute divorce.2"
This quality is not without its antithetical aspect however.
It not only allows the offended spouse to seek a divorce later
without fear of the defense of condonation if an attempted
reconciliation has failed, but it also allows the same spouse
to again separate and bring an action for divorce even if the
attempt by the party at fault was sincere and his or her ways
were completely mended. The second separation might be at
the mere whim or caprice of the originally offended spouse
and still receive court protection.
There is another aspect of the new remedy that provides
added protection for the injured spouse. The injured spouse
may refuse an offer from the offending spouse to mend his
or her ways and reconcile without being guilty of constructive
'desertion." The decree itself is a measure of the duties of
the parties, and under the decree there is no duty or right
to cohabitation. 8 The separation may be maintained under
legal protection. This differs substantially from -a mere
decree of separate maintenance, where it is possible for the
non-offending spouse to be guilty of constructive desertion
if he or she continues to live apart after there has been a
bona fide offer to mend ways and resume cohabitation."
Thus, a wife who chooses to get a separate maintenance decree instead of a limited divorce does so at the peril of being
obliged to accept such an offer or be put in the position of
a deserting wife."0 Wyoming, in addition to the effect of
the decree itself, expressly eliminates the ground of desertion
from arising as a ground for absolute divorce after the decree
of judicial separation has been rendered." Desertion under
such circumstances becomes a legal impossibility.2
This "quality," as stated above, is not without reproach.
The purported purpose of the law is to aid in reconciliation.
If this is true, the question arises whether a party should
26.
27.
28.
29.

WYo. STAT. § 20-47.2 (Supp. 1965).
Darden v. Darden, supra note 7, at 410.
Scholz v. Schloz, supra note 3.
Malouf v. Malouf, 54 Wyo.233, 90 P.2d 277 (1939) citing Rylee v. Rylee,
142 Miss. 832, 108 So. 161 (1926).
30. 35 CALIF. L. REV. 154, 156 (1947).
31. WYO. STAT. § 20-47.2 (Supp. 1965).
32. Boger v. Boger, 86 W.Va. 590, 104 S.E. 49, 50 (1920).
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be allowed to refuse or ignore a bona fide offer to reconcile.
If answered in the negative, it would appear to be in derogation of the alleged purpose of the new law; however, under
the judicial separation law of Wyoming, this is not only
permitted, but court protected. The separate maintenance
remedy gives one spouse the power to force a reconciliation
upon the unwilling spouse, under penalty of becoming guilty
of desertion. The philosophy of the limited divorce, on the
other hand, is that it takes mutual consent to bring about a
reconciliation.
An advantage stemming from the survival of the decree
during attempted reconciliation is the co-survi.val of the support provisions. Reconciliation and resumption of marital
relations abrogate a prior decree of separate maintenance,"
but they do not affect such provisions in a judicial separation.
Thus, a wife can perform her part of an attempt to save the
marriage and need not take further legal action for support
if the attempt fails and she again desires to live apart from
her spouse. The wife, however, is precluded from demanding
payments due under the 'decree which accrue during the
period of cohabitation.s4
The survival of support provisions after failure of an
attempt to reconcile also has its ominous side. It appears
that it might have an adverse affect on the motive or sincerity
of an attempt at reconciliation, the spouse knowing that if
it fails, no further legal action need be taken to return to the
original separated status.
VARIATIONS

There are two different classes of statutes that provide
both limited divorce and absolute divorce. One allows judicial
separation for grounds less severe than for an absolute
divorce, or at least provides different or enumerated
grounds. 5 The other, like Wyoming's contemplates the same
33. Van Dolman v. Van Dolman, supra note 18.
34. Sommer v. Sommer, 248 App. Div. 827, 289 N.Y. Supp. 18 (1936).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1521 (1953); D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1961);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1230 (1946); LA. CIV. CODE art. 138 (Dainow 1961);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 581, 582 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 25 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 20A and ch. 209, § 32 (1955)
(in essence provide for a legal separation); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.87
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grounds and same action for a limited 'divorce as for an
absolute divorce.3" This has the effect, in Wyoming, of giving
the petitioners a mere election as to remedy. Since the grounds
for a judicial separation are the same as for an absolute
divorce, the proof requirements also remain the same, even
though the remedy is of a different nature. 7
There are two other major variations in statutory law
in the states allowing limited 'divorce on the same grounds,
but in lieu of absolute divorce. Arizona allows a limited
divorce not only on the same grounds as an absolute divorce,
but on any circumstances the court feels would make cohabitation unsafe. 8 Rhode Island39 and Kentucky"0 statutes provide the same grounds for limited as absolute divorce, plus
any other grounds the court deems sufficient. Provisions of
the latter type provide an offended spouse an additional
remedy where the misconduct is not sufficient to support an
action for absolute divorce and there are no grounds for a
support action. This seems to be in keeping with the fact
that a limited divorce is less final than an absolute divorce
and does not abrogate the marriage. In contrast, under the
rigid requirements of the new Wyoming law there is, in
essence, no new relief provided. This new legislation merely
changes the nature of the old remedy.
The decree may be rendered as perpetual or for a limited
time. If perpetual, the only means of nullification is to motion
the court to have it vacated or proceed with a new action
for absolute divorce. If the decree is issued for a limited
time, it will cease to exist at the expiration of that time and
the parties will be returned to their original married status.

36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

(1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-302 (1943); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-2 (1951);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-2 (1953); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 200; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-7 (1950); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.210 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 11 (1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-802 (1955); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-95 (1950).
ALA. CODE tit. 34 § 36 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-29 (1958);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 324-60 (1955); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.050 (1962);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 21-103 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:26
(1955); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-06-01 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-9
(1956) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 854 (1958); WIS. STAT. § 247.07 (1963);
WYO. STAT. § 20-47.1 (Supp. 1965).
Caine v. Caine, 262 Ala. 454, 79 So.2d 546, 548 (1955).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1956).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-9 (1956).
KY. REV. STAT. § 403.050 (1962).
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Under the Wyoming statute the option as to time is left to
the discretion of the court.' Of the thirteen states providing
judicial separation on the same grounds as divorce," four
provide a similar perpetual or limited option.4" The others,
with one exception, are silent on the subject, eliminating the
power of the court to decree a judicial separation for a limited
time." The exception is Hawaii, where a limited divorce can
be decreed for a maximum of two years.4 5
In one of the four states providing an option as to time
limit of the decree, the power of the option is vested in the
court as it is in Wyoming."
PROPERTY DivISION

Wyoming's new statute gives the court the power to make
any decree of property division upon granting a limited
'divorce.4 ' This, of course, is an anomaly to common law.
Where the common law is in force a limited divorce does
not change the property rights of the parties. 8 Unless the
statute or decree provides otherwise the property rights and
interests of the parties usually remain unchanged." Since a
limited divorce does not remove the vinculum of marriage,
the spouses' inheritance rights and homestead rights remain."
In light of a later reconciliation a large property division
could be quite cumbersome. Generally when a limited divorce
is annulled because of reconciliation, all the decrees are annulled except for property division." If the separation were
to remain perpetual, the property division might prove to
be unjust and burdensome in view of the spouses' remaining
rights.
A few states have considered the property aspect specifically in their judicial separation statutes instead of using
a mere incorporation by reference of absolute divorce pro-

46.
47.
48.

WYO. STAT. § 20-47.3 (Supp. 1965).
See statutes cited noted 36 supra.
Arizona, North Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin.
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire and
Rhode Island.
HAWAII REv. LAWS § 324-60 (1955).
WiS. STAT. § 247.07 (1963).
WYO. STAT. § 20-47.3 (Supp. 1965).
Rudin v. Rudin, 104 N.J.Eq. 524, 146 AtI. 351, 352 (1929).

50.
51.

McWilliams v. McWilliams, supra note 1.
Paille v. Paille. 91 N.H. 249, 17 A.2d 445, 448 (1941).

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

49. Ibid.
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visions. Arizona's statute provides for support out of the
husband's property, but does not contemplate division,5 2 and
Rhode Island's provides that support may be assigned out
of the property or estate as necessary. 3 Hawaii's provision
is similar.5 4 Vermont provides for property division as in
an absolute divorce,' but also provides that the laws of descent
applicable to absolute divorce shall apply." Wisconsin provides that, if there is a final division of property in a legal
separation, dower and curtesy rights will be relinquished. 7
In absence of such a provision, however, the spouses' property
rights remain unchanged. The effect of the wife electing a
perpetual limited divorce is an election to retain interest in
the husband's estate if he predeceases her and the right to
share and participate in division of his personal property
and homestead." Even where statutes authorize final property 'division, some courts have used restraint in exercising
the power in view of the dynamic character of the decree
of limited divorce. In Nebraska, for example, where the court
also has power to make a permanent property division,59 it
has been held that property interests in a limited divorce
will not be adjusted any further than is necessary to effect
a proper separation under the facts.6" This judicial restraint
seems wise.
The argument is that a separation agreement does not
establish a permanent status of the parties, and thus permanent property division should be declined. 6 The Wyoming
legislature recognized the unchanged status in a separation
and di'd not provide permanent property division under its
separate maintenance law, 2 nor did the courts desire to furnish it by interpretation." Similarly, a limited divorce does
ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-333(B)
(1956).
53. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-9 (1956); Accardi v. Accardi, 197 A.2d 755,
758 (R.I. 1964). (Statute held not to create a charge on the husband's
property).
54. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 324-63 (1955).
55. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 556 (1958).
56. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 753 (1958).
57. Wis. STAT. § 247.36 (1963).
58. Adair v. Adair, 258 Ala. 293, 62 So.2d. 437, 443 (1952).
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-302 (1943).
60. Scholz v. Scholz, supra note 3.
61. Doole v. Doole, 144 Mass. 278, 10 N.E. 811, 814 (1887).
62. WYo. STAT. § 20-36 (1957).
63. Brown v. Brown, 23 Wyo. 1, 146 Pac. 231, 233 (1915).

52.
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not effectuate a permanent status of the parties, but under
Wyoming statute a permanent property division is within
the power of the court.
VACATE OR MERGER

The Wyoming statute provides a method whereby the
decree may be vacated, but it does not provide a means for
merging the decree into one of absolute divorce in event the
alleged purpose of reconciliation fails. 4 It appears that a
new action must be initiated. Since the allegations have once
been proved and the action once litigated under the same
requirements as for an absolute divorce, it would appear
sensible that the parties might, by mere motion, have the
decree merged into one for absolute divorce. Such merger
might even be automatic after a certain specified time, as
in the case of interlocutory decrees.
Of the thirteen states providing a limited 'decree in lieu
of the absolute, for the same grounds and in the same type
of action,6 5 five have provided for such a contingency. Alabama provides that either party may petition the court to
have the decree made absolute if the parties have lived under
the limited decree and apart for four years." Wisconsin
requires five years and a similar petition. 7 Connecticut provides for the merger of a limited decree into one of absolute
divorce on petition of either party and proof that there has
been no reconciliation, no time limit being required." Kentucky provides for a merger, again with no time limit, upon
joint application of the parties similar to Wyoming's provision for motion to vacate."0 Hawaii, which limits a judicial
separation to two years, provides that upon expiration of
that time either party may, upon application and proof of
no reconciliation, have the "decreemerged into one for absolute
divorce." Such provisions for merger are in keeping with
the idea that one of the purposes of the limited divorce
WYO. STAT. § 20-47.3 (Supp. 1965).
See statutes cited note 36 supra.
ALA. CODE tit. 34 § 22(1) (1958).
WIs. STAT. § 247-07 (1963).
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-30 (1958).
KY. REV. STAT. § 403.050 (1962).
70. HAWAII REV. LAws § 324-80 (1955).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol1/iss1/9

10

Holst: Judicial Separation

1966

LEGISLATIVE COMMENTS

is to provide a remedy for an aggrieved party while still
keeping the doors of forgiveness open, but that the decree
itself is unsavory as a permanent remedy.
CONCLUSION
Whether the new judicial separation law will serve its
purported purpose of encouraging attempts at reconciliation
must be determined by time. It has been shown that many
features might aid accomplishment of this purpose. These
are: (1) the parties are free to attempt reconciliation ithout
fear of being accused of condonation; (2) the offended party
is free to leave the other spouse if an attempt to reconcile
fails, without fear of being accused of desertion; (2) the
original grounds of divorce will survive the 'decree for a later
action for absolute divorce if the marriage is irreparable;
(4) if an attempt to reconcile fails, no further litigation is
necessary to reacquire the benefits of the original decree;
(5) no new ceremony is required to place the parties back
in their original married status, as they need only to have
the court vacate the decree; and, (6) the power of the court
is practically unlimited and any degree of relief may be ordered by the court.
It has also been shown, however, that there are certain
latent features which are not quite so appealing. Those most
obvious are: (1) the originally offended spouse may cohabit
intermittently at his or her will without fear of reprisals of
desertion under sanction of the court; (2) the offended spouse
may refuse a bona fide offer of reconciliation under the protection of the decree; and, (3) the property rights as to descent
remain unchanged, yet the court may impose any property
division at its discretion. Whether these features outweigh
those of value is a matter of conjecture.
There is a line of thought severely questioning the limited
divorce as a remedy for domestic strife. It has been professed
that a limited divorce is inherently against social policy and
betterment. The remedy has been considered hazardous to
the morals of the parties as it places them back upon society
as a husband without a wife and a wife without a husband.7'
71.

KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 305, 306

(Morland 3d ed. 1946).
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"[I] t places them [the parties] in a situation where there
is an irresistible temptation to the commission of adultery,
unless they possess more frigidity, or more virtue than generally falls to the share of human beings."7 2 Another author
has put it that, "A limited divorce makes them dead to each
other and a menace to society. "" This line of thought undoubtedly holds some truth.
Wyoming's new judicial separation law leaves little room
for interpretation. The petition, action, grounds, defenses
and the powers of the court are, by reference, identical to
those of the absolute divorce. Two major additions were
made to complete the scheme of judicial separation: (1) the
grounds upon which a limited 'divorce is granted are preserved for a later action for absolute divorce and (2) the
parties are given the right to have the divorce decree nullified.
Presently there are no recorded cases on judicial separation in Wyoming.
JACK A. HOLST

72. Mr. Justice Swift in Swift's System of Laws (Conn.)
KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

306, (Morland 3d ed. 1946).

193 as cited in

73. 43 Ky. L.J. 322, 324 (1955).
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